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Introduction 
The papers presented at the 2006 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments 
cover a vast spectrum of issues and use a wide variety of methods. Still, there is an under-
lying theme, which is an effort to enhance our understanding of monetary economics, 
broadly deﬁ  ned, and to uncover new ways to think about important substantive issues. 
Basic Research
In search models, the distribution of wealth may be nondegenerate, which makes ana-
lytic solutions difﬁ  cult at best. As a result, efforts have been made to construct environ-
ments where the distribution is degenerate. One such environment is the large-house-
hold model, where each household consists of a non-atomic measure of agents. In the 
literature which uses this framework, perhaps surprisingly, there does not exist a per-
fectly clear notion or at least a deﬁ  nition of equilibrium. In “Equilibrium Concepts in the 
Large-Household Model,” Tao Zhu formulates two concepts of equilibrium in the context 
of a monetary environment. In what he calls the no-commitment approach, individual 
household agents search for partners and make their own utility maximizing choices in 
separate meetings. In what he calls the commitment approach, the household chooses a 
contingent plan for individuals, who must abide by this plan. To obtain a degenerate dis-
tribution of money under the no-commitment approach, a large household with nonlin-
ear preferences is converted into one with quasilinear preferences. In the commitment 
approach, commitment itself yields a degenerate distribution. However, allocations in the 
commitment approach are not subgame perfect, which results in a weaker equilibrium 
concept.
In “Anonymous Markets and Monetary Trading,” C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, and 
Daniela Puzzello point out that random anonymous matching is not in itself sufﬁ  cient to 
make money essential in models with alternating decentralized and centralized markets 
(which many people are studying these days). They show eliminating money need not 
re- duce efﬁ  ciency if the actions of trading partners are observable and if are sufﬁ  ciently 
patient. The idea is that centralized trading allows rapid exchange of privately observed 
information, so a credible informal enforcement scheme exists, which sustains the ef-
ﬁ  cient allocation without money. However, this “social norm” is not robust to adding a 
small amount of noise in observations. They go on to examine variations on the basic 
environment where money is essential. In particular, inﬁ  nitely-lived agents repeatedly 
move in and out of markets populated by numerous anonymous agents, who are always 
complete strangers because their trading paths intersect at most once. In this environ-
ment money is essential. The authors’ techniques can be used to expand the modeling 
of environments in which money has a necessary role. 
Models such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) have both barter and monetary equilibria. 
These models, however, cannot explain the transition from a barter equilibrium to a POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 18, MARCH 2007
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monetary equilibrium. In “The Rise of Money: An Evolutionary Analysis of the Origins of 
Money,” Kevin Hasker and Tahmilci develop a model that addresses the issue. A standard 
theory of stochastic evolution is modiﬁ  ed so that agents are able to calculate out-of-equi-
librium continuation values. This is a subtle but important point because, in the context 
of monetary economics, accepting money today—which is an out-of-equilibrium ac-
tion in a barter equilibrium—requires the agent to calculate the future value associated 
with this action. In the standard stochastic evolution model, agents are assumed to be-
have myopically (choosing the action that maximizes current period payoffs). Hasker 
and Tahmilci demonstrate that under reasonable conditions, nonconvertible ﬁ  at money 
emerges naturally in complex economies.
Despite the recently successful efforts at characterizing optima in models where 
money is essential, virtually all research on business cycles with money ignore optimal-
ity. This gap is in part explained by the prominence of real-business-cycle models for 
which the standard welfare theorem applies; that is, decentralized equilibria correspond 
to Pareto-optimal allocations. Since there are no welfare theorems for monetary econo-
mies, concerns about the optimality of responses to real shocks in a monetary context 
should be raised. In “Optimal Propagation of Real Shocks in a Cash-in-Advance Model” 
Ricardo Cavalcanti shows that the optimal allocations in monetary models can be his-
tory-dependent; that is, output is not only a function of the current realization of the real 
shock, but it depends on the entire history of the economy. Thus, monetary models may 
display business-cycles properties that are different in nature from their standard real 
counterparts, with different implications for ampliﬁ  cation and propagation of shocks.
In “Learning by Matching,” Manuel Amador and Pierre-Olivier Weill study the interac-
tion between public and private learning channels in a large population. At the begin-
ning of time, private information about the state of the economy is disseminated among 
a large number of agents. Then, in every period, each agent observes a public and private 
noisy signal centered around the average action taken by the population. The public 
signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a prices or quantities. The 
private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and 
local interactions. Armador and Weill identify conditions such that the average learning 
curve is S-shaped; that is, learning starts slow, intensiﬁ  es rapidly, and ﬁ  nally converges 
to the truth, as found by a number of empirical studies. Perhaps surprisingly, they show 
that increasing public information at the beginning slows down learning in the long run 
and, under some conditions, reduces welfare.
Fiscal Policy
In “Dynamic Taxation, Private Information, and Money,” Christopher Waller studies opti-
mal ﬁ  scal and monetary policy in a model where the frictions giving rise to money are 
modeled explicitly. Most of the literature on the inﬂ  ation tax adopts a Ramsey approach. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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government is assumed to be unable to use lump sum taxes and chooses distortionary 
taxes to maximize welfare of the representative agent. There are two drawbacks to this 
approach. First, lump-sum taxes achieve the ﬁ  rst-best allocation, and the approach sim-
ply prohibits their use for unmodeled reasons. Second, money is “forced” into the model 
via some shortcut (money-in-the-utility function, cash-in-advance, etc.). Waller combines 
modern monetary theory with the .new dynamic public ﬁ  nance. using an overlapping 
generations model with agents born every other period. The young and old trade in per-
fectly competitive centralized markets. In middle age, agents receive preference shocks 
and trade among themselves in an anonymous search market where money is essential. 
The efﬁ  cient allocation trades off risk sharing against production efﬁ  ciency. For a govern-
ment to replicate this outcome in a monetary economy, without record-keeping, distor-
tionary taxation of money is needed: lump sum taxation is feasible, but not optimal.
Following the Ramsey tradition, Boragan Aruoba, and Sanjay Chugh study “Optimal 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy when Money Is Essential.” Three important ﬁ  ndings emerge: 
The Friedman rule (zero nominal interest rates) is typically not optimal; inﬂ  ation should 
be stable over time; and optimal policy includes a subsidy to capital. The deviation from 
the Friedman rule emerges because of the Ramsey planner’s desire to create a wedge be-
tween the decentralized market—where money is essential—and the centralized mar-
ket—where it is not. They argue that inﬂ  ation is not a substitute for a missing tax, as is 
sometimes assumed in standard models, but is precisely the right tax to use in this case. 
Inﬂ  ation should be stable over time, in contrast to standard Ramsey models. Finally, since 
production in the decentralized market is lower than the optimal level, there is underac-
cumulation of capital, which can be ameliorated by a subsidy to capital income. These 
three ﬁ  ndings contrast sharply with traditional Ramsey models.
Banking and Payments
In “Payment Networks in Search Model of Money,” Antoine Martin, Michael Orlando, and 
David Skeie study a model that gives rise to a payment network. Speciﬁ  cally, they assume 
agents can pay a one-time cost to access a central database that keeps track of payments. 
This approach will prove fruitful to study payments in a general equilibrium setting. Two 
incentive constraints are key in this context: Agents must have an incentive to pay the 
cost to access the database, and agents with access to the data must have an incentive to 
produce. Conditions are determined under which these constraints are simultaneously 
relaxed. The analysis supports the “no surcharge rule” of credit card companies (the price 
of a good should be the same regardless of whether it is purchased with cash or cred-
it card). Multiple equilibria can arise because of network effects, and policies are stud-
ied that ameliorate this. These policies include increasing the money supply and taxing 
agents who do not pay the access cost to the database, the latter being more efﬁ  cient. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 18, MARCH 2007
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In “Banking, Inside Money, and Outside Money,” Hongfei Sun studies a model with 
spatial separation, private information, and aggregate uncertainty. A bank provides two 
services: It intermediates by managing monetary payments, and it conducts stochastic 
monitoring. The optimality and operating characteristics of various payment arrange-
ments are examined, including inside money, outside money, and the coexistence of 
both. Banking with only inside money strictly dominates. Outside money allows agents 
to participate in future markets, which provides a disincentive for them to pay off cur-
rent obligations. Inside money that expires immediately after settlement, however, has 
no value in the future and, hence, avoids this result. Previous papers identify greater 
ﬂ  exibility and the ability to respond to unanticipated shocks as beneﬁ  ts associated with 
private money; the current paper identiﬁ  es another and quite novel advantage of private 
money.
The Friedman rule is optimal in a wide class of models and is a straightforward policy 
to implement, requiring only that the nominal interest rate be zero. Thus, models that 
imply the optimality of the Friedman rule also imply that monetary policy is simple. 
However, in practice, monetary policy appears to be difﬁ  cult. In “Banks, Open Market 
Operations, and the Friedman Rule,” Stephen Williamson studies four models of money. 
In the ﬁ  rst three, some version of the Friedman rule is optimal, even in cases where it 
has been claimed in the literature that it is not. Therefore, the Friedman rule is even more 
robust than previously thought. However, in a model of money and credit with mar-
ket segmentation, the Friedman rule is not optimal, and determining optimal monetary 
policy is a nontrivial task, consistent with reality. This ongoing work very much helps to 
integrate theory and policy.
A well-known model by Green and Lin assumes a version of the Diamond-Dybvig 
banking model with a ﬁ  nite number of agents, independent determination of each 
agent’s type, and sequential service. For special preferences, Green and Lin show that 
the ex ante ﬁ  rst-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome even with private 
information about types. In “The Role of Independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dy-
bvig Model,” David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal, and Neil Wallace show, via a simple argument, 
that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in 
particular, for a constrained-efﬁ  cient allocation whether ﬁ  rst-best or not. The crucial as-
sumption that is needed is independence. This very much advances and helps our un-
derstanding of modern banking theory.
In “Competition in the Supply of Fiat Money,” Luis Araujo and Braz Camargo model an 
economy where both the demand and supply of money are endogenously determined, 
and money is essential. This paper provides a formal assessment for a commonly held 
view that money should not be relegated to the market. For example, Friedman (1959) 
argued that “monetary arrangements have seldom been left entirely to the market, even 
in societies following a thoroughly liberal policy in other respects, and that there are FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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good reasons why this should have been the case.” Two distinct market structures are 
considered. In one, there is natural monopoly in that only one agent produces money, 
and in the other, money can be produced by more than one agent. The authors focus on 
the dynamic incentives of the money supplier in providing a stable currency in order to 
build a good reputation, and how outcomes are affected by competition.
Standard theory implies the correlation between velocity and nominal interest rates 
is negative. However, in the 1984 to 2004 U.S. data, this correlation is positive. In “U.S. 
Money Demand: Theory and Evidence,” Marcus Hagedorn develops a theory of money 
demand that reconciles these observations. After a careful look at the data, he builds a 
model where Diamond-Dybvig banks are integrated into a dynamic equilibrium frame-
work. Households receive liquidity shocks that determine their rate of time preference, 
and ﬁ  rms receive productivity shocks. Households need money for transactions, but 
ﬁ  rms can use either bonds or money for investment. A bank is an intermediary that 
provides households with money or investments, and purchases bonds from ﬁ  rms. In 
the model, the monetary transmission mechanism works through banks and, speciﬁ  cally, 
through the way they manage the provision of liquidity. The model is consistent with the 
above-mentioned facts.
Money and Other Assets
Money and nominal bonds coexist, with bonds dominating money in the rate of return. 
In recent history, government bonds bear little default risk and they have most of the in-
trinsic features of money, but they do not act as medium of exchange to the same extent. 
The literature explains coexistence by assuming legal restrictions that reduce individu-
als’ utility. Finding an efﬁ  ciency role for legal restrictions, and hence for illiquid bonds, 
seems important. In “Welfare Improvement from Restricting the Liquidity of Nominal 
Bonds,” Shoyoung Shi constructs a model in which a medium of exchange helps decen-
tralized markets for goods, where individuals face shocks to tastes and production. Be-
cause capital markets are imperfect, they cannot insure against these shocks easily. A legal 
restriction prohibits nominal bonds from being used as a means of payment in a subset 
of trades. Shi shows this legal restriction can improve the society’s welfare by effectively 
providing partial insurance against the shocks.
In “Counterfeit Money,” Elena Quercioli and Lones Smith develop a tractable theory 
of counterfeiting. They assume counterfeiters compete against both law enforcement 
and the public, who must verify currency. There is variable veriﬁ  cation effort. Hence, 
individuals play a “hot potato” game, where everyone seeks to avoid acquiring counter-
feit currency. With higher denominations, counterfeiters producer better quality, and 
veriﬁ  ers respond with greater effort. The theory yields some key time series and cross-
sectional patterns of counterfeiting: (a) the ratio of seized to passed money rises in 
the denomination; (b) the vast majority of counterfeit money used to be seized before POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 18, MARCH 2007
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circulation, while now the reverse holds; (c) the most counterfeited denominations are 
$10, $20, and $100, while $5 and $50 are least; and (d) the share of passed money found 
by Federal Reserve Banks generally falls with the value of the note, while their passed 
money rate is a U-shaped function of the economywide passed money rate.
In “Financial Market Frictions and Price Stability,” Gabriele Camera and Francesco Rus-
citti study the impact of inﬂ  ation on real and ﬁ  nancial activity in the Lagos-Wright model. 
Financial intermediaries are banks that collect deposits and make loans to provide work-
ing capital. The asset-transformation process, however, is subject to frictions that gener-
ate a random non-interest cost to banks. In the model, inﬂ  ation ampliﬁ  es the severity of 
ﬁ  nancial market frictions, which affects productive activities. This paper complements a 
literature that studies mechanisms to which excessive inﬂ  ation is especially disruptive. 
As inﬂ  ation grows, the cost of liabilities rises, and banks reduce costs by undertaking 
fewer and cheaper projects. Also, there exists an inﬂ  ation threshold beyond which the 
loan supply is so limited that ﬁ  rms cannot get enough funds to hire workers. This con-
strains employment, production, and consumption. This model constitutes an important 
step in understanding the role of monetary policy in ﬁ  nancial intermediation.
Schumpeter long ago established a link between ﬁ  nance and innovation. Leo Ferraris 
and Makoto Watanabe, in “Money, Credit, and Collateral,” examine an aspect of this link 
that has received scant attention: the relationship between innovation and means of pay-
ment. On one hand, innovators would like to sell innovations and reap rewards immedi-
ately; on the other, they want to have enough time to sell innovations without facing the 
competition from the ﬁ  rst buyers, who may copy them. In a world with limited enforce-
ment and limited property rights, the choice of the payment instrument will affect the 
extent to which innovations spread through the economy. The use of credit is beneﬁ  cial 
for the innovator since it allows him to be a monopolist seller for some time into the 
future (until he delivers the blueprint), but the cost is that he receives a portion of this 
payoff in the future. This style of research, exploring the links between ﬁ  nance and inno-
vation, is potentially very important for understanding growth and development. All of 
the work reviewed in this section help us to understand the interplay between ﬁ  nance 
and the macroeconomy.
Labor Markets
The relationship between inﬂ  ation and unemployment is one of the most important is-
sues in macroeconomic theory and policy. Much progress has been made on these is-
sues recently by incorporating frictions using search theory, but existing models analyze 
either unemployment or inﬂ  ation separately. Aleksander Berentsen, Guido Menzio, and 
Randall Wright develop a framework to analyze the two phenomena together in “Inﬂ  a-
tion and Unemployment.” Their paper makes contributions to two disparate literatures 
and provides a uniﬁ  ed model for theory, policy analysis, and quantitative work. The au-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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thors calibrate their model and discuss the extent to which it can account for the salient 
aspects of the U.S. experience over the past 50 years with inﬂ  ation, unemployment, inter-
est rates, and velocity. They also discuss optimal ﬁ  scal and monetary policy.
In “Money in Production and Frictions in the Labor Market” Alok Kumar formalizes 
the idea that money facilitates the organization of production processes. In the model, 
a double-coincidence-of-wants problem arises due to the potential mismatch between 
what workers consume and what ﬁ  rms produce. Money facilitates trading in both the 
labor market and the goods market. The model allows a natural integration of imperfect 
labor markets into monetary economies. The paper studies the effects of inﬂ  ation on 
output, employment, real wages, and welfare under three wage-setting mechanisms: indi-
vidual bargaining, union bargaining, and an efﬁ  ciency-wage mechanism. It is shown that 
an increase in inﬂ  ation reduces output and employment under all three mechanisms 
and raises real wages under individual and union bargaining. Both this and the paper 
by Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright contribute to the integration of macrolabor and mon-
etary economics.
Liquidity and Inﬂ  ation
In “Liquidity,” Ben Lester, Andrew Postlewaite, and Randall Wright develop a model with 
real assets and money, where these assets may have differential liquidity (i.e., a differen-
tial probability of being accepted in exchange). They study which agents and transactions 
are affected by monetary policy, and the effects on prices and allocations. They show that 
even agents and transactions that never use cash are affected by inﬂ  ation or interest rates. 
They also endogenize liquidity in the model by introducing recognizability: For example, 
money may be perfectly recognizable, but not everyone is informed enough to distin-
guish real from counterfeit claims to other assets. Given the costs of becoming informed, 
the model determines who accepts what in equilibrium. A version with money and T-bills 
is used to analyze open-market operations.
In “Liquidity and Spending Dynamics,” Veronica Guerrieri and Guido Lorenzoni study 
how ﬁ  nancial frictions affect the response of an economy to aggregate shocks, focusing 
on liquidity constraints. They use the Lagos-Wright model, augmented with productivity 
shocks. They show that the response to aggregate shocks depends on the rate of return 
on liquid assets. When liquid assets pay a low return, agents hold smaller reserves, and 
the response tends to be larger. In this case, agents expect to be liquidity constrained and, 
due to a precautionary motive, their consumption decisions respond more to changes in 
expected income. On top of this, there is a general equilibrium effect that magniﬁ  es the 
economy’s response. This model is extremely interesting because it shows that inﬂ  ation 
(monetary policy) can, in principle, have a big impact on the response of the economy 
to real shocks.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 18, MARCH 2007
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In “Heterogeneity and the Suboptimality of the Friedman Rule,” Paola Boel and Ga-
briele Camera attempt to harmonize various strands in the literature on the cost of 
inﬂ  ation by retaining the explicit microfoundations found in the Lagos-Wright model, 
but enriching it by introducing some heterogeneity to generate a tractable distribution 
of wealth. The model is calibrated and used to quantify the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. At 
the aggregate level, estimates for the cost are not far from estimates in Lagos-Wright. 
However, heterogeneity affects the conclusions a lot. When distributional effects are 
examined, inﬂ  ation can be welfare-increasing for a segment of the population. This is 
another example of how models with explicit microfoundations can greatly enhance 
our understanding of policy issues.
In “Search, Market Power, and Inﬂ  ation Dynamics” by Allen Head and Beverly Lapham, 
buyers in each of two countries observe a random sample of prices posted by both 
domestic and foreign sellers. Shocks to money or productivity change the returns to 
search in both countries. Movements in search intensity result in changes in the average 
markup, and this has a number of implications for both price-level movements and ﬂ  uc-
tuations in both output and consumption across countries. Money is non-neutral in the 
short run as shocks to the money growth rate have different effects on agents’ returns 
to search in the two countries. As even transitory shocks result in persistent movements 
of the distribution of wealth across countries, the responses of search intensity and thus 
the movements in the real exchange rate that they generate are persistent as well. The 
model can account for several facts difﬁ  cult to capture with previous models.
In “The Welfare Costs of Expected and Unexpected Inﬂ  ation,” Miguel Faig and Zhe Li 
introduce imperfect information about nominal shocks à la Lucas into the Lagos-Wright 
framework. Now the welfare cost of erratic monetary policy depends not only on the 
variability it generates in real GDP, but also on the concentration of these effects on 
particular segments of the economy and on the tolerance of individuals to ﬂ  uctuations 
in that segment. The empirical analysis indicates that the welfare gain of eliminating 
the U.S. monetary business cycle observed from 1892 to 2005 is only 0.0026 percent 
of GDP while the welfare gain of reducing the observed average rate of inﬂ  ation to the 
Friedman rule is 0.2 per cent of GDP. This calls for a reconsideration of what issues are 
most policy relevant in monetary economics. All of the papers reviewed in this section 
suggest reconsideration of some fundamental policy issues.
Market Structure
Financial markets, such as the NYSE or the NASDAQ, are highly liquid, warranted by vari-
ous market-makers, dealers and other specialists that facilitate trades. While their role as 
providers of immediacy may be inconspicuous in normal times, it becomes critical in 
times of large imbalances. In “Crashes and Recoveries in Illiquid Markets,” Ricardo Lagos, 
Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill take seriously the line that asset markets FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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are not frictionless and that intermediaries are there to remedy these frictions. They as-
sume that there are trading delays that limit investors’ access to the market, while dealers 
have instantaneous access. The authors derive conditions on fundamentals under which 
dealers accumulate asset inventories when the aggregate demand for the asset falls. They 
show dealers’ intervention is useful when a crisis is severe, short-lived, and unanticipated. 
They show dealers are less likely to intervene in times of crisis if they have high market 
power. And they show dealers are less likely to provide liquidity during a market crash 
when trading delays are short.
In “A Model of Money with Multilateral Matching,” Manolis Galenianos and Philipp 
Kircher study a model of monetary exchange where goods are allocated according to 
auctions. Their novel result is that homogeneous buyers hold different amounts of mon-
ey, leading to equilibrium price dispersion. Two important frictions are that the buyer 
can visit only one seller at a time and sellers have some capacity constraint. The intuition 
behind the main result that identical buyers choose to bring different amounts of money 
to the decentralized market is straightforward: If all buyers held the same amount of 
money, then a deviant bringing inﬁ  nitesimally more would always win the good and 
hence enjoy a discretely higher probability of consuming for negligible additional cost. 
To examine how output is affected by inﬂ  ation, an entry decision by sellers is intro-
duced. The result is that entry is suboptimal except at the Friedman rule.
People produce goods so that they can be sold to others; when people sell goods they 
can then purchase the goods they desire. If there is little or no money in the economy, 
agents have to rely on barter, which can be especially tough for producers of specialized 
goods. If, however, there is a signiﬁ  cant amount of liquidity in the economy, the problems 
faced by specialists are reduced. In “Money and the Variety of Goods,” Ken Burdett and 
Andrei Shevchenko investigate the number of goods that will be produced. The model 
emphasizes the interpretation of goods as bundles of characteristics. Agents can pro-
duce specialist or generic goods. Preferences are heterogeneous, and each agent has a 
favorite variety: A generic good does not yield as much utility as your favorite. Barter and 
monetary allocations are compared, and the authors ﬁ  nd that money encourages the 
production of specialist varieties. Although this is an old idea, is it useful to formalize it, 
and this model does deliver several new insights.
Lagos and Wright propose a framework for monetary policy analysis that is analyti-
cally tractable. The tractability, however, comes at a cost. By allowing agents to rebalance 
their portfolios for free every period, the centralized market in the Lagos-Wright model 
effectively provides an “insurance” that allows agents to undo all individual-speciﬁ  c trad-
ing shocks immediately. The special assumptions needed to generate tractability rule out 
potentially interesting effects. In “Endogenously Segmented Markets in a Search-Theo-
retic Model of Monetary Exchange,” Jonathan Chiu and Miguel Molico add frictions that 
imply agents choose to attend the centralized market only infrequently and hence an POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 18, MARCH 2007
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inventory of money for decentralized market trade. By endogenizing the decision to par-
ticipate in the centralized market, the model endogenizes the responses of velocity, out-
put, and other variables. The welfare cost of inﬂ  ation is different from the baseline Lagos-
Wright model because inﬂ  ation can now distort the consumption proﬁ  le, affect market 
participation, and redistribute money holdings. There are more channels through which 
inﬂ  ation can affect welfare in the new model. First, it induces agents to participate in 
the centralized market more frequently, which is costly in terms of resources. Second, 
even if the participation rate were unchanged, agents spend their money faster to avoid 
the inﬂ  ation tax, making consumption less smooth. Third, inﬂ  ation redistributes money 
holdings. This new class of models greatly enhances our understanding of the effects of 
inﬂ  ation.
In “Bidding for Money” Benoit Julien, John Kennes, and Ian King explore the robust-
ness of the results from search-theoretic monetary models when the assumptions of 
random matching and bilateral bargaining are replaced with different microfoundations. 
In particular, they introduce directed search and multilateral matching into a model 
which is otherwise standard, based on Shi and Trejos-Wright (1995), and they consider 
two pricing mechanisms: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding. Once search is 
directed (guided by prices) the arrival rate that sellers face is no longer given, but a func-
tion of the price associated with a seller. Thus, directed search allows for the existence 
of monetary equilibria with price posting—something that cannot be obtained with 
random matching. Overall, they show that this variation of the Shi-Trejos-Wright model 
preserves many of its original properties, and hence the conclusions of previous mon-
etary models are actually quite robust.
Summary
The 2006 workshop provided an excellent opportunity to hear about work by, and to in-
teract with, some of the best researchers in the areas of theory, policy, and quantitative 
analysis relating to money, banking and payments systems. Hopefully the insights offered 
in these papers helps not only theoretical monetary economists, but also economists 
such as central bankers with a more practical policy-oriented view.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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